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Unitary Taxation and International Tax Rules  
 
Reuven Avi-Yonah and Zachée Pouga Tinhaga 
 
 
Summary 
 
Any proposal for adoption of a unitary tax (UT) system ought to clear the first and most common 
hurdle of its compatibility, or lack of it, with the current norms in the international tax system – 
specifically, the current tax treaty network. This paper argues that unitary taxation is compatible 
with most of the current bilateral tax treaties and local countries’ national tax laws.  
 
The first argument levelled against UT is the revision of the United States (US) and Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) model tax treaties to specifically exclude 
application of UT through formulary apportionment. However, this argument carries little to no 
weight because most tax treaties currently outstanding, including those signed as recently as 
2011 and even involving the US, do not adopt the changes and still contain Article 7 language 
allowing for a unitary approach.  
 
Another argument for incompatibility is that separate accounting (SA) and arm’s length standard 
(ALS) are so enshrined in tax treaties that they have become some sort of international law that 
is binding even when not explicitly stated. This argument, again, has no merit. On the one hand, 
it is well established that tax treaties, specifically model tax treaties, do not create a right to tax 
and cannot create a binding rule of law, even international law. On the other hand, and 
assuming the wide embodiment of SA into the treaties creates some sort of international binding 
norm, the same argument would hold for UT because the Article 7(4) language that authorises 
UT is still very present in most tax treaties currently outstanding. 
 
We acknowledge that a complete transition from SA to UT would be a long-term process 
requiring major revisions across the international tax regime; however, it is our view that 
countries in general, and developing countries in particular, can legally apply UT because it is in 
compliance with both the tax treaties they have signed, if any, and their national laws. 
 
Keywords: unitary taxation; tax; international tax; formulary apportionment; separate 
accounting; arm’s length standard; developing countries; multinational companies. 
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Introduction 
 
Any proposal to adopt unitary taxation (UT) of multinationals has to contend with whether such 
taxation is compatible with existing international tax rules, and in particular with the bilateral tax 
treaty network. Indeed, some researchers have argued that the separate accounting (SA) 
method and the arm’s length standard (ALS), introduced in the early twentieth century (League 
of Nations 1927, 1928, 1933),1 are so embodied in the treaties that they form part of customary 
international law and are binding even in the absence of a treaty. We disagree because the 
unitary approach is just as widely embodied in most of the current international tax treaties and, 
where there are no treaties, national laws allow for a unitary approach to taxation. In this paper 
we will argue that UT can be compatible with most existing tax treaties, and that developing 
countries in particular can implement it in most cases with or without a tax treaty and in 
accordance with their domestic laws. 
 
 
1  UT and the existing treaty network  
 
Transfer pricing is currently governed by Article 9 of the double tax treaties, which assumes the 
SA method because it addresses the commercial or financial relations between associated 
enterprises.2 Traditionally, the term permanent establishment (PE) was meant to include 
separate entities (subsidiaries). However, in 1933 the League of Nations introduced Article 5 
(ancestor to the current Article 9 of the OECD Model) where separate enterprises were no 
longer considered PEs (League of Nations 1933: Art. 5). If UT were adopted, Article 9 would 
become irrelevant in those situations to which UT applies (i.e. where a unitary business is found 
to exist), because UT ignores the transactions between related parties and treats them instead 
as part of a single enterprise. 
 
Instead, UT would be governed by Article 7. Under Article 5(7), ‘[t]he fact that a company that is 
a resident of a Contracting State controls or is controlled by a company that is a resident of the 
other Contracting State … shall not of itself constitute either company a permanent 
establishment of the other’. However, it is well established that a dependent agent can be a PE 
(see Article 5(5)), and whether an agent is dependent is based on whether the principal 
exercises legal and economic control over the agent.3 ‘An agent that is subject to detailed 
instructions regarding the conduct of its operations or comprehensive control by the enterprise is 
not legally independent’ (US Treasury 2006). 
 
In the case of a modern, integrated multinational enterprise (MNE) that operates as a unitary 
business, a strong argument can be made in most cases that the parent of the MNE exercises 
both legal and economic control over the operations of the subsidiaries, especially where the 
subsidiaries bear no real risk of loss and acquire goods and services exclusively or near 
                                                 
1  For a brief account of the history see S. Picciotto (2013), especially pp. 10-15. 
2  The quoted articles are identical in all the tax treaty models except when discussed in the text. 
3  See, e.g., Roche Vitamins Europe Ltd v. Administracion General del Estado, Case No. STS/202/2012 (Spanish Supreme 
Court Jan. 12, 2012)  (Swiss principal had PE in Spain through an affiliated Spanish company; activity of the subsidiary was 
directed organised and managed in a detailed manner by the principal); Salad Dressing, Fiscal Court Baden-Wurttemberg, 3 
K 54/93, Internationales Steuerrecht 1997 (Swiss principal had a PE at the premises of an unrelated German contract 
manufacturer based on detailed instruction by principal); Milcal Media Limited, Court of Appeal, Stockholm, Case nos. 7453-
54-02 (2005) (Cyprus principal had a PE through Swedish subsidiary because it was subject to detailed instructions and 
control); eFunds Corp. v. ADIT, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi, 2010; Lucent Technologies v. DCIT, Income Tax 
Appellate Tribunal, 2008 (US parent company had a service PE in India); and the cases cited by Le Gall (2007).  
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exclusively from the parent or other related corporations. The existence of intranets in most 
MNEs has resulted in most important operational decisions being centralised. In that case, the 
subsidiaries should be regarded as dependent agents of the parent. Such a finding is in fact 
made with increasing frequency in both developed and developing countries (Le Gall 2007). 
 
If the subsidiary is an agent of the parent, Art. 7(2) of the double tax treaties requires the 
attribution of the same profits to the subsidiary ‘that it might be expected to make if it were a 
distinct and independent enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or 
similar conditions’.  Arguably, the application of UT satisfies this arm’s length condition because 
in the absence of precise comparables, which almost never exist, it is not possible to determine 
exactly what profits would have been attributable to the subsidiary under SA.  
 
When the US adopted the comparable profit method (CPM) and profit split in the 1994 transfer 
pricing regulations, some countries objected that it was violating the double tax treaties because 
these methods did not rely on exact comparables to find the arm’s length price. However, these 
objections eventually subsided, and OECD endorsed similar methods in its transfer pricing 
guidelines and more recently granted them equivalent status to the traditional methods. The US 
has always maintained that both CPM and profit split satisfy the arm’s length standard despite 
the lack of precise comparables (and in the case of profit split, using no comparables at all to 
allocate any residual profits). Similarly, the US has maintained that the ‘super-royalty rule’ of 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 482 (which requires royalties to be ‘commensurate with 
the income’ from an intangible, and therefore subject to periodic adjustment) is consistent with 
the arm’s length standard, even though no comparables can be found to show that such 
adjustments are ever made by unrelated parties. 
 
Before the recent changes to the OECD Model Convention (MC), it was therefore quite plausible 
to argue that UT was compatible with the double tax treaties if the subsidiary were as a factual 
matter legally or economically dependent on the parent so as to constitute a PE. In addition, a 
country that wished to adopt UT could rely on the language of the OECD MC Article 7(4): 
 
Insofar as it has been customary in a Contracting State to determine the profits to be 
attributed to a permanent establishment on the basis of an apportionment of the total 
profits of the enterprise to its various parts, nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that 
Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as 
may be necessary; the method of apportionment adopted shall, however, be such that the 
result shall be in accordance with the principles contained in this Article. 
(OECD MC Article 7(4)) 
 
Since it can be argued that in the absence of comparables the result reached under UT is 
equivalent to what could be reached under SA, this language seems to permit the use of UT for 
dependent agent PEs.  
      
However, OECD in 2010 adopted changes to Article 7 of the MC that would make this argument 
more difficult to sustain. Specifically, OECD adopted the ‘authorised OECD approach’ to the 
attribution of profits to a PE that treats a PE as equivalent to a subsidiary, and has suggested 
that the transfer pricing guidelines that explicitly reject UT should be applied to PEs. In addition, 
OECD has followed the US lead and deleted article 7(4) from its MC. However, not all OECD 
countries accepted these changes, which were also rejected by developing countries, and the 
United Nations (UN) Model Tax Treaty still contains Article 7(4). 
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In fact, the vast majority of existing actual treaties have not been revised to incorporate those 
changes. In particular, the Appendix shows that many developing country treaties contain Article 
7(4), even when the treaties are with OECD members. The Appendix lists 174 such treaties by 
developing countries that contain this language, including recent treaties such as India-Lithuania 
(2011), India-Nepal (2011) and Korea-Panama (2010), and treaties with OECD members such 
as India-Sweden, India-UK, Mexico-UK and Sri Lanka-US.  In all of those cases, or in the 
absence of a treaty, countries should be free to implement UT in accordance with the analysis 
set out above.  
 
Customary international law 
 
The argument of customary international law does not impede the application of a UT approach, 
either. The argument is based on the contention that because SA and the ALS are embodied in 
all the treaties they should be considered binding. But embodiment in the treaties is not enough 
to create a customary international law ban on UT, since Article 7(4) is embodied as well. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that model tax treaties do not, in any way or form, create a ‘right 
to tax’ (Vogel 1997: 26 onwards; see also Fiscal Committee 1958: 12). The key issue is the 
actual practice of states – what countries actually do, as domestic laws reign supreme in the 
area of taxation and many of them follow UT approaches in practice. In addition, countries 
should be free to follow the UN model which does not adopt the changes made by OECD, and 
which is also widely followed. 
 
Finally, it can be argued that even OECD may be revising its approach. The authorised OECD 
approach may have marked the high point of OECD commitment to SA. With the beginning of 
the base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) project, which is influenced by large developing 
countries like China and India, it is likely that OECD may be stepping back from its total 
commitment to SA.  Specifically, the potential adoption under BEPS of country-by-country 
reporting (which is already required for extractive industries in the US) can be the basis for 
implementation of UT. This development is very important for developing counties, as many rely 
heavily on extractive industries. The requirements of country-by-country reporting, if 
implemented, will likely start with the extractive industries so as to draw from the US experience 
with the system, and will thereby allow a profound change in taxation of the major industry in the 
developing world: the extractive industry. 
 
Does Article 7 preclude the application of UT to entire MNEs? 
 
One important question raised by Durst in his contribution to this research programme is 
whether the requirement that profits be ‘attributable’ to a PE under Article 7 of the model tax 
treaties means that if UT is applied, it must be done on an activity-by-activity basis (Durst 2014). 
Otherwise profits would be attributed to the PE that have nothing to do with it, because the PE is 
not engaged in the activity that generates these profits. However, one would rather not make 
this assumption, because allowing an MNE to split its activities among different subsidiaries is 
notoriously hard to combat, and facilitates precisely the kind of profit shifting that developing 
countries in particular have a hard time policing. 
 
In our opinion, the phrase ‘attributable to a permanent establishment’ does not preclude 
attribution of global profits of an MNE to a PE under whatever formula is adopted for UT 
purposes. The reason is that once a functional analysis is performed, and whatever can be 
attributed to the various functions by using either comparables or a proxy (such as a fixed 
percentage of costs as suggested by Durst in our previous work (Avi-Yonah et al. 2009)), the 
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remaining residual can be allocated in any way we wish, since it is attributable to the entire 
MNE. 
 
Profit splits frequently result in a residual that cannot be allocated under the traditional functional 
analysis because it results from cost savings that inhere in the relationship of the group 
members to each other. The classic example is the US case involving Bausch and Lomb (B and 
L).4 B and L developed an unpatented technology that enabled it to manufacture contact lenses 
at a cost of $2.50 per lens, when its competitors had costs of $7.50 per lens. B and L contributed 
the know-how to its Irish subsidiary. The question facing the US court was whether to accept B 
and L’s view that the comparable uncontrolled price method should apply to determine the price 
charged by the Irish subsidiary to its parent based on a comparison with prices charged by 
independent lens manufacturers despite the difference in production costs. The Inland Revenue 
Service (IRS) argued that the residual profit from the know-how belonged to the US parent that 
developed it, but the court rejected that view because the residual profit inhered in the 
relationship between the parties. Had B and L Ireland been unrelated to its parent the know-how 
would have been disclosed, the competitors would have used it, and the residual profit would 
have disappeared. 
 
The OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines (OECD 2010) do not say what should be done with 
residuals under the profit split method. The US regulations follow the White Paper5 in assuming 
that any residual results from intangibles and allocating the residual to where the intangibles 
were developed. This is a view that favours US revenue interests because more intangibles are 
developed in the US than elsewhere, but not surprisingly it has not been accepted by other 
OECD members. Nor is it congruent with the facts, since residuals can result from other reasons 
such as cost savings from synergies or advantages of scale, and they usually inhere in the 
relationship among the group members and cannot be allocated to any one of them. 
 
OECD’s preferred method of applying the profit split method is to analyse the functions, assets 
and risks of each member of the affiliated group. However, in the context of residuals this 
method also proves to be illusory. A functional analysis can only be applied to those functions 
that can be assigned to the group members, such as production or distribution, but it does not 
help with residuals that result from the relationship among the group members. Assets can 
include intangibles, which are usually the most valuable assets of a modern MNE, but 
intangibles also get their value from the relationship among the group members, as illustrated by 
the B and L case. This makes it very difficult for them to be allocated either to where they were 
developed or where they are exploited. The Glaxo case6 in which the IRS and Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) disagreed about whether the profit from selling Zantac, a drug 
developed in the UK, into the US market resulted from the intangibles embodied in the drug itself 
or those used in Glaxo’s marketing resulted in massive double taxation. 
 
Risk is the trickiest concept of all. Recent case studies by the US Joint Committee on Taxation 
reveal a model in which the entrepreneurial risk for a product is assigned to an affiliate in a low 
tax jurisdiction and the manufacturing and distribution of the product in high tax jurisdictions are 
done on a contract manufacturing and commissionaire basis (Joint Committee on Taxation 
2010). But it is not clear what the allocation of entrepreneurial risk means among related parties. 
If a product fails because of technological change or defects in manufacturing or environmental 
                                                 
4  See Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. C.I.R., 933 F.2d 1084 (1991). 
5  IRS Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458 (a US Treasury study of transfer pricing methodology that resulted in the development 
of the comparable profits method and profit split). 
6  GlaxoSmithKlineHoldings (Americas) Inc. and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, No. 5750-04 (T.C. Apr. 2, 2004). 
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hazards the risk is effectively borne by the entire MNE, or more accurately by its management 
who risk being fired and by its shareholders who see the stock price plummet. 
 
Under UT, these issues can be solved by using the formula to allocate the residual by the profit 
split method. The specific formula used can be negotiated, and is the topic of Durst’s 
contribution to this programme (Durst 2014). But in our opinion it is clear that whatever formula 
is decided upon should be applied under UT to the entire profit of the integrated MNE and not 
divided into separate activities, and that this would be perfectly congruent with Article 7. 
 
 
2  UT and developing countries  
 
What can a developing country do to implement UT? In the absence of a treaty or in the event 
the treaty contains Article 7(4) language, the biggest obstacle to UT implementation may be 
access to information.   
 
The recent redraft of the UN Transfer Pricing Manual recommends that among the 
documentation which a tax administration should request for a transfer pricing audit should be 
the ‘Group global consolidated basis profit and loss statement and ratio of taxpayer's sales 
towards group global sales for five years’ (UN 2013: para. 8.6.9.12). This provides a good basis 
for application of UT. The development of a global template for country-by-country reports by 
MNEs, mandated by the G20 and being developed as part of OECD’s BEPS project, would also 
facilitate such an approach. The rejection of UT in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines is 
based on its definition of formulary apportionment as ‘applying a formula fixed in advance’. This 
leaves considerable scope for adoption of UT approaches with ad hoc formulas, which are not 
based on a fixed formula. 
 
Specifically, as discussed in Michael Durst’s work, allocation according to operating expenses 
would be clearer and easier to administer, and most importantly would fit within the current rules 
of international tax (Durst 2014). We have argued that in the context of the profit split method, 
the residual profit cannot be allocated on the basis of comparables and therefore can be 
allocated based on operating expenses without deviating from the ALS. This would entail first 
assigning to each country an estimated market return on the tax deductible expenses incurred 
by the multinational group in that country. 
 
Developing countries should therefore be encouraged to draft their transfer pricing laws to 
include powers to adjust the accounts of any foreign-owned local company or branch, if the 
Revenue Authority considers that its accounts do not fairly reflect the profits earned locally, to 
bring the taxable profits into line with those which such a business would be expected to earn, 
having regard to (a) similar businesses either in that country or elsewhere, and/or (b) the 
relationship of the local business to the worldwide activities of the corporate group of which it is a 
part. This would involve analysis and comparison of provisions in the tax laws of appropriate 
countries. A good model would be Section 482 of the US IRC, which predates the ALS and is 
very open-ended.7 
                                                 
7  ‘In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized in 
the United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary 
may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such 
organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in 
order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations, trades, or businesses.’ (IRC 
482). 
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3  Conclusion 
 
The transition from SA to UT is likely to be a long process, and it may ultimately require 
renegotiating the treaties or even drafting a multilateral treaty like the EU’s Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base. However, a good beginning can be made now by exploring 
how developing countries can adopt UT principles within the context of the existing treaty 
network. This paper has endeavored to show that such approaches are quite feasible because 
most developing countries are not bound by the authorised OECD approach to Article 7, and 
because even OECD may be reconsidering its approach in the context of the BEPS project. 
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Appendix  Current tax treaties with Article 7-4 language (data compiled from the 
IBFD, June 2012, <http://www.ibfd.org/IBFD-Products/Tax-Treaties-Database>) 
 
CONTRACTING 
STATES 
DATE ADOPTED VERSION OF ARTICLE 7:   
7-4 LANGUAGE 
TENTATIVE 
CONCLUSION 
INDIA &    
Japan March 7, 1989 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
New Zealand Oct. 17, 1986 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Singapore Jan. 24, 1994 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Israel Jan. 26, 1996 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Kuwait June 15, 2006 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Lithuania July 26, 2011 
Art. 31 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Luxemburg June 2, 2008 
Art. 32 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Mexico Sept. 10, 2007 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Mozambique Sept. 30, 2010 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Myanmar April 2, 2008 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Namibia Feb. 15, 1997 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
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Nepal Nov. 27, 2011 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Norway Dec. 31, 1986 
Art. 31 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Oman April 2, 1997 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Philippines Feb. 12, 1990 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Taiwan July 12, 2011 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Serbia & 
Montenegro 
Feb. 8, 2006 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Sri Lanka Jan. 27, 1982 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Sweden June 7, 1988 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Syria June 18, 2008 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Tajikistan Nov. 20, 2008 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Tanzania May 27, 2011 
Art. 31 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Thailand Mar. 22, 1985 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
United Kingdom Jan. 25, 1993 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article shall 
preclude that Contracting State from determining the 
profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be 
necessary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
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Ukraine April 7, 1999 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Vietnam Sept. 7, 1994 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
INDONESIA &  
  
Netherlands Mar. 5, 1973 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Switzerland Aug. 29, 1988 
Art. 25 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Iran April 30, 2004 
Art. 27 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Japan Mar. 3, 1982 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Kuwait April 23, 1997 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Mauritius Dec. 10, 1996 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Mexico Sept. 6, 2002 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Korea July 11, 2002 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
New Zealand Mar. 25, 1987 
Art. 27 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Philippines June 18, 1981 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Poland Oct. 6, 1992 
Art. 27 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
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Portugal July 9, 2003 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Slovakia Oct. 12, 2000 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Syria June 7, 1997 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Thailand Mar. 25, 1981 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Tunisia May 13, 1992 
Art. 27 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Nov. 30, 1995 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
United Kingdom April 5, 1993 
Art. 27 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Ukraine April 11, 1996 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Venezuela Feb. 27, 1997 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Vietnam Dec. 22, 1997 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Zimbabwe May 30, 2001 
Art, 29  
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
KOREA &  
  
Syria Feb. 21, 2000 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Mexico Oct. 16, 1994 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
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Malta Mar. 25, 1997 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Romania Oct. 11, 1993 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Sri Lanka May 28, 1984 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Switzerland Feb. 12, 1980 
Art. 26 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Tunisia Sept. 27, 1988 
Art. 27 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Ukraine Sept. 29, 1999 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Russia Sept. 26, 1997 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Myanmar Feb. 22, 2002 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Oman Sept. 23, 2005 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Panama Oct. 20, 2010 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Slovakia Aug. 27, 2001 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Slovenia April 25, 2005 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Thailand Nov. 16, 2006 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Sept. 23, 2003 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
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Venezuela June 26, 2006 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
MEXICO &  
  
Netherlands Sept. 27, 1993 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Singapore Nov. 9, 1994 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Switzerland Aug. 3, 1993 
Art. 26 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
United Kingdom June 2, 1994 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Norway Mar. 23, 1995 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Poland Nov. 30, 1998 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Portugal  Nov. 11, 1999 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Romania July 20, 2000 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Russia June 7, 2004 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Slovakia May 13, 2006 
Art. 27 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Spain July 24, 1992 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Sweden Sept. 21, 1992 
Art. 27 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
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Ukraine Jan. 23, 2012 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Venezuela Feb. 6, 1997 
Art. 30 
 ‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
MOROCCO &  
  
Pakistan May 18, 2006 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Poland Oct. 24, 1994 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Portugal Sept. 29, 1997 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Romania Sept. 11, 1981 
Art. 27 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Singapore Jan. 9, 2007 
Art. 27  
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Switzerland Mar. 31, 1993 
Art. 27 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Ukraine July 13, 2007 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
NETHERLANDS 
& 
 
  
Norway Nov. 13, 1989 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
New Zealand Oct. 15, 1980 
Art. 27 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
South Africa Mar. 15, 1971 
Art. 31 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
 
  
 
  
19 
Slovakia Mar. 4, 1974 
Art. 31 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Venezuela May 29, 1991 
Art. 31 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Oman Oct. 5, 2009 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Pakistan Mar. 24, 1982 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Panama Oct. 6, 2010 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Poland Sept. 20, 1979 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Portugal Sept. 20, 1999 
Art. 32 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Qatar April 24, 2008 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Taiwan Feb. 27, 2001 
Art. 27 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Romania Mar.5, 1998 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Saudi Arabia Oct. 13, 2008 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Slovenia June 30, 2004 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Sri Lanka Nov. 17, 1982 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
United Arab 
Emirates 
May 8, 2007 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
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Uganda Aug. 31, 2004 
Art. 31 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Venezuela May 29, 1991 
Art. 31 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Vietnam Jan. 24, 1995 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Zambia Dec. 19, 1977 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Zimbabwe May 18, 1989 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
PHILIPPINES &  
  
Poland Sept. 9, 1992 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Qatar Dec. 14, 2008 
Art. 29  
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Romania May 18, 1994 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Russia April 26, 1995 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Singapore Aug.1, 1997 
Art. 27 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
ROMANIA &  
  
San Marino May 23, 2007 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Switzerland Oct. 25, 1993 
Art. 29  
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
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Qatar Oct. 24, 1999 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Yugoslavia May 16, 1996 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Russia Sept. 27, 1993 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
RUSSIA &  
  
Switzerland Nov. 15, 1995 
Art. 27 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Yugoslavia Oct. 12, 1995 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Slovenia Nov. 29, 1995 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Sri Lanka Mar. 2, 1999 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Syria Sept. 17, 2000 
Art. 27 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Thailand Sept. 23, 1999 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Venezuela Sept. 22, 2003 
Art. 29 
‘… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary…’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Vietnam May 27, 1993 
Art. 27 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
SAUDI ARABIA 
& 
 
  
Ukraine Sept. 2, 2011 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
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Vietnam April 10, 2010 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
SERBIA &  
  
Slovenia June 11, 2003 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Spain Mar. 9, 2009 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Turkey Oct. 12, 2005 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Jan 13, 2013 
Art. 29 
 ‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
SOUTH AFRICA 
& 
 
  
Switzerland July 3, 1967 
Art. 27 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Ukraine Aug. 28, 2003 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
SRI LANKA &  
  
United Kingdom June 21, 1979 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
United States 
Mar. 14, 1985 
As amended by 
2002 protocol 
Although this paragraph is not included in the US Model, 
this is not a substantive difference because the result 
provided by paragraph 4 is consistent with the rest of 
Article 7.  
The US view is that paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 7 
authorise the use of total profits methods independently of 
paragraph 4 of Article 7 of the OECD Model because 
total profits methods are acceptable methods for 
determining the arm’s length profits of affiliated 
enterprises under Article 9. Accordingly, it is understood 
that, under paragraph 2 of the Convention, it is 
permissible to use methods other than separate 
accounting to estimate the arm’s length profits of a 
permanent establishment where it is necessary to do so 
for practical reasons, such as when the affairs of the 
permanent establishment are so closely bound up with 
those of the head office that it would be impossible to 
disentangle them on any strict basis of accounts.  
 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
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Sweden Feb. 23, 1983 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Switzerland Jan. 11, 1983 
Art. 27 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Thailand Dec. 14, 1988 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Sept. 24, 2003 
Art. 31 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
United Kingdom June 21, 1979 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Vietnam Oct. 26, 2005 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
SUDAN &  
  
United Arab 
Emirates 
Mar. 18, 2001 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
SWEDEN &  
  
Tanzania May 2, 1976 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Thailand Oct. 19, 1988 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Feb. 1984 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Tunisia May 7, 1981 
Art. 26 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Ukraine Aug. 14, 1995 
Art. 27 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
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Venezuela Sept. 8, 1993 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Vietnam Mar. 24, 1994 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Zambia Mar. 18, 1974 
Art. 27 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Zimbabwe Mar. 10, 1989 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
TAIWAN &  
  
Thailand July 9, 1999 
Art. 26 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Vietnam April 13, 1998 
Art. 27 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
MONGOLIA &  
  
Poland April 18, 1997 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Singapore Oct. 10, 2002 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Switzerland Sept. 20, 1999 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Thailand Aug. 17, 2006 
Art. 28  
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Feb. 21, 2001 
Art. 28  
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
United Kingdom April 23, 1996 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
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Ukraine July 1, 2002 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Vietnam May 9, 1996 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
 
MAURITIUS & 
 
  
Oman Mar. 30, 1998 
Art. 27 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Singapore Aug. 19, 1995 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Sweden April 23, 1992 
Art. 27 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Zimbabwe Mar. 6, 1992 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
MALAYSIA &  
  
United Kingdom Dec. 10, 1996 
Art. 30 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Mauritius Aug. 23, 1992 
Art. 26 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Syria Feb. 26, 2007 
Art. 29 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Turkmenistan Nov. 19, 2008 
Art. 27 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Nov. 28, 1995 
Art. 28 
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
Yugoslavia April 24, 1990 
Art. 28  
‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
KENYA & 
 
Dec. 26, 2006 
Art. 27  Implementation of a formulary 
apportionment method would be 
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Thailand ‘nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an 
apportionment as may be customary’ 
valid under the treaty thus not 
requiring treaty renegotiation. 
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